

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

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		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	ADCI	2	✓		
3	EXDIR	3	✓		
4	D/ICS				
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9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACUS	4	✓		
21	NIO/SP	5	✓		
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		SUSPENSE _____ Date			

*[Signature]*  
Executive Secretary  
3/30/83  
Date

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
March 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-86)  
U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations (S)

The attached National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-86, documents the President's decision concerning near term changes to the U.S. approach to the INF negotiations. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
William P. Clark

Attachment

NSDD-86 (S)

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
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March 28, 1983

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 86U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS (U)

The U.S. Delegation to the INF negotiations is directed to make a proposal based upon the following elements to the Soviet Union before the end of the current round of negotiations: (C)

- The U.S. continues to believe that the zero-zero outcome is the optimal outcome. (C)
- Without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have previously identified, however, the U.S. will deploy LRINF land based missiles as planned by NATO. (C)
- While maintaining the other elements of the U.S. INF position, and, as an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land based missiles, the U.S. could agree to accept a limit at one of a number of certain discrete levels provided that the level would satisfy the criteria cited above and provided the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to reduce its corresponding LRINF land based missile forces to an equal level. (S)
- Therefore, the U.S. INF Delegation should notify the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on longer-range, land based INF missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. (C)
- The U.S. views such an agreement as an interim step to the total elimination of weapons of this class. It hopes the Soviet Union will recognize the wisdom of this and join us in this view, but it does not make a commitment by the Soviet Union to ultimately negotiate a zero-zero outcome a precondition for the negotiation of what we would view to be an interim solution. (C)

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